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ESTATES BY ENTIRETY-BEIHL vs. MARTIN
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently decided, in the
case of BeihI vs. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, that where both tenants of
an estate by entirety join in a deed conveying the property, the
purchaser takes a good title and this title is not impaired by a
prior judgment obtained against one of the tenants.
The facts of the case sufficient for our purposes were these:
A property was acquired by deed of conveyance to a husband and
wife. The husband, Ernest H. Beihl, was adjudged a bankrupt
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania on the second of July, i9o9. On the same day,
several judgments were entered against the husband by creditors
who subsequently filed their respective claims with the referee ap-
pointed in the bankruptcy proceedings.
The wife did not join in or consent to the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. In September, 1911, Beihl and his wife entered into an
agreement with William T. Martin to convey to him the property
in question "clear of any and all judgments and defects of every
kind and particularly clear of any contingent claim of ownership
or interest which might or could be enforced against the said
premises." The question was whether or not under these facts
a proper deed from Beihl and his wife to Martin would convey
such title to the premises as was stipulated for in the agreement.
The Court held that it would. Counsel for Martin contended
that such a conveyance could not be made in view of the previously
obtained judgments and in support of this contention cited the
case of Fleek vs. Zilhaver, 117 Pa. 213.
In that case, husband and wife held title to a property. Judg-
ments were obtained against the husband and properly indexed
in the judgment index; subsequently, the husband and wife both
joined in the mortgage on the same property. Later, the wife
died and an execution was issued upon the judgments that had
been obtained against the husband and the land sold thereunder.
A scire facias on the mortgage followed and the party holding
title from the sheriff was served as terre tenant. The question was
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the efficiency of the sheriff's sale under the judgment to pass title,
and this depended on the priority of the one lien over the other.
The Court held that the purchaser at the sheriff's sale on the
judgments took a valid title clear of the lien of the mortgage. In
reaching this conclusion, the court said:
"As against the wife, the mortgage was undoubtedly the first
and indeed the only lien. As against the husband, the judgment
was the first lien and the mortgage the second, simply because
the judgment was obtained before the mortgage was given. Had
the wife survived, the mortgage would certainly have had the
precedence to the exclusion of the judgment, because the estate
bound by the lien of the judgment was defeasible by the death of the
husband before the wife. For the same reason, if the husband
survived the wife, the estate of the latier was divested and the
mortgage only became operative against the husband because he
had joined in its execution. But as to him, it was not the first
lien, he having become subject to a judgment at a time anterior
to the giving of the mortgage."
In distinguishing this case from the case before them the
Stipreme Court in the Beihl case said:
"This case stands as an authority with respect to what it
expressly rules, viz.: That the interest of husband and wife where
they hold by entireties may be subject of lien, and that upon the
death of either the lien against the survivor may be enforced. It
is to be observed that it does not rule that there can be a severance
in ownership in any other way than by the death of one or other
of the parties or by voluntary alienation by both."
The conclusion reached settles to a considerable extent the
uncertainty created by the Fleck vs. Zilhaver decision. It is sub-
mitted, however, that its value is somewhat impaired as a result
of the position which the court was forced to take in its attempt to
distinguish the two cases. As a consequence, the court has added
fuel to the fire which it should have extinguished.
In defining this estate, Blackstone says: "If an estate in fee
be given to a man and his wife, they are neither proper joint ten-
ants nor tenants in common: For husband and wife being considered
as one Person in law, they cannot take an estate by moieties, but
both are seized of the entirety, per tout et non per my (by all and
not by half); the consequence of which is that neither husband
nor wife can dispose of any part without the consent of the other,
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but the whole must remain to the survivor."' And, according to
Preston's definition, tenancy by entireties "is where husband
and wife take an estate to themselves jointly by grant or devise,
or on limitation of use made to them during coverture, or by grant,
etc., which is in fieri (in being) at the time of the marriage and
completed by livery of seisin or attornment during coverture.,"
And where an estate is granted in fee to a husband and wife
and a third person, the husband and wife take only one moiety
between them and the third person takes the other moiety.*
And this is true, notwithstanding that the estate is granted
to be held in common not as joint tenants.4
This estate has several peculiarities. The husband has the
entire use and the wife has the entire use, for there are no moieties
between husband and wife. Hence, it is termed tenancy by en-
tireties' and in the excellent notes to Dean Lewis' Edition of Black-
stone, "n the Second Volume, page 102, it is said:
"The husband cannot forfeit or alien so as to sever the ten-
ancy. As the husband and wife cannot sue each other (except
in a few instances by legislative sanction), they are not compell-
able to make partition."
The legal fiction of unity of husband and wife has been strictly
adhered to in Pennsylvania. Not only is it true in this Common-
wealth that a conveyance or devise, which as to unmarried persons
would make them joint tenants or tenants in common, will as to
married persons create an estate by entireties,' but this is so, even
if the conveyance or devise is expressly made to the husband and
wife "as tenants in common and not as joint tenants."'
These authorities establish beyond doubt the fact that the
reason for the rule that a conveyance to husband and wife, which
as to unmarried persons would make them tenants in common,
creates an estate by entirety, is founded on the legal -ction of the
unity of husband and wife. The opinions in our own courts are
12 Blackstone,* Page i82.
2 i Preston on Estates, 131.
'Johnson vs. Hart, 6 W. and S., 319 (Pa.).
'Barker vs. Harris, 15 Wend. 6z5 (N. Y.).
'C. J. Montague in Plowden, S8.
'Simon's Estate, 4 Clark 204 (1847, Pa.).
7Stuckey vs. Keefe, 26 Pa., 397; McCurdy vs. Canning, 64 Pa., 39.
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based on this theory. In the case of Sftuckey vs. Keefe's executors,
the court expressly approved Chancellor Kent's statements that
the reason for the rule is founded not on any supposed intention
of the parties to the conveyance, but on the unity of husband and
wife, and as a necessary result of that unity they cannot take by
moieties.
This discussion of the incidents of the estate indicates the
extent of each tenant's interest therein. But the real question
is the extent of tlie power of each tenant to deal individually with
that interest, and bind the other tenant's interest. It is cer-
tainly obvious that the very foundation of the estate, the "unity"
of the parties, requires "unity" of action to bind the estate. On
this point, all authorities agree. The difference occurs in the
answer to the question "what does a judgment creditor of either
tenant acquire qua the estate?"
The question has been answered by the Supreme Court of
Penn-ylIrania in three different cases involving as many situa-
tions. In chronological order the facts were as follows:
I. A judgment was entered against the husband; subsequently,
husband and wife joined in mortgaging the estate. After the
death of the wife, execution was issued on the judgment against
the husband and the estate sold.
II. A municipal lien was filed against the wife and during
the life of both tenants execution was issued thereunder and the
estate sold.
III. A judgment was entered against the husband;.subse-
quently, husband and wife covenanted to convey the entire estate
clear of any encunrbrances to a third person.
In the first case, as has been shown earlier, the court said that
the judgment creditor of the husband may issue execution on such
judgment and the purchaser would take a title unencumbered by
the mortgage. On a writ of error, the case was taken to the
Supreme Court on the ground, inter alia, that the trial judge had
erroneously charged the jury. The charge isworthyof attention.
In part, the trial judge said: "Although owing an. undivided one
half by virtue of his, the husband's tenancy as a joint tenant, upon
the death of his wife, the whole property became vested in him
82 Kent's Com. 132; 4 Kent's Co. 362.
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and he was the mortgagor, but, there being an open judgment en-
tered against him prior to that time, the title he acquired by the
death of his wife inures to the benefit of his judgment creditors."D
The trial judge then ordered a verdict for the purchaser at sheriff's
sale on the judgment. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. While it is true that joint tenants own an undivided one-
half interest, that is precisely wherein a joint tenancy differs from
a tenancy by the entirety. It was upon this distinction that the
Act of 1812, abolishing joint tenancies, was held not to apply to
tenancies by entirety. The husband and wife in this case were
tenants by the entirety and. as such were seized of the whole, and
the husband did not own "an undivided one-half by virtue of his
tenancy as a joint tenant." If the husband's interest was an un-
divided halU.then we would have no quarrel with the proposition
that a judFient against the husband would be a lien on his in-
terest, but the difficulty arises from the fact that his interest is an
undivided interest in the whole and- that of his co-tenant a like
interest. "The estate of joint tenants is a unit made up of di-
visible parts; that of husband and wife is also a unit, but it is made
up of indivisible parts."I$ In the light of this definition the lower
court erred in that part of the charge which has been quoted, but
the Supreme Court with no reference to this manifest error affirmed
the judgment in a very brief opinion. While it is true that the
court neither adopts nor rejects the view taken by the trial judge,
the brevity of the opinion compels the conclusion that the decision
was influenced by it. Mr. Justice Green said:
* "It was the kind of an estate which was bound by the lien
of tj*e mortgage given by Mary Holcomb; and it was the same
kind of an estate which uw bound by the lien of the judgment
against her husband."n
In the second case, Mr. Chief Justice Mitchell said:
"It appears by the case stated, that the husband and wife
were registered owners by entireties of the lot in question when
the municipal lien was filed against the wife alone ..
9FIeek v. Zilhaver, supra, at page 215.
" Beihl vs. Martin, supra, at page 523.
nFleek vs. Zilhaver, 117 Pa., at page 21&
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As against the husband therefore, the lien was a nullity and the
sale under it passed no title."'"
Our third case was the case of Beild vs. Martin, cited at the
outset of this paper. The court held that the voluntary transfer
by the husband and wife gave to the transferee a iharketable title
free from the lien of any judgments against the husband. After
citing the case of Fleek vs. Zilhaver, supra, with approval, the
court, in distinguishing the cases, said:
"This case (Flek vs. Zilhaver) stands as an authority with
respect to what it expressly rules ... ...... It is to be ob-
served that it does not rule that there can be a severance in the
ownership in any other way than by the death of one or other of
the parties, or by voluntary alienation by both." In other words,
the severance of the estate occurs only upon the happening of either
one or the other of the two contingencies pointed out; death of
either one of the joint owners or voluntary alienation by both."
That the facts were different in each case is not denied, but
that only one underlying principle was involved is beyond ques-
tion. The three cases agree in one point, namely: In each, a judg-
ment was entered against either one or the other of the two owners.
The difference arose out of the subsequent disposition of the
estate. As a result of these cases, these propositions are
established.
I. If the tenant against whom the judgment is entered sur-
vives the other, the judgment has priority over a mortgage exe-
cuted by both tenants subsequent to the entry of the judgment.
II. If, however, the judgment creditor issues execution on
his judgment in the lifetime of both tenants a sale thereunder
passes no- title to the purchaser.
III. Where both tenants voluntarily execute a deed of con-
veyance to a third party, such purchaser takes a clear title, and
the judgment creditor, though prior in point of time, has no rights
as against the estate in the hands of the purchaser.
All three decisions involve the same principle and can be
sustained only upon the position, first, that.the judgment creditor
of the one tenant has by virtue of his judgment a lien on the es-
tate, and second, that this lien, though attaching to the estate,
" Allen vs. Lyons, 216 Pa., 6o4.
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remains dormant, not alone dependent on the death of the other
tenant, but living only in the hope that there will be no united
voluntary action on the part of both tenants to cut off its peaceful
existence.
With all due respect to the authorities quoted, it is submitted
that either the judgment in these cases is a lien, or it is not a lien.
If it is a lien, it should be given the same force and effect as any
other lien entered against the absolute owner of an estate. In
the latter case, execution may be issued at any time, and priority
between lien holders depends upon exactly what the word indicates.
Responsibility for this new kind of a lien evolved by the court
cannot be placed upon the peculiar nature of the estate in question.
According to the earliest definitions of the rights of the co-owners,
neither one of the tenants can interfere with the proper enjoyment
of the estate by the other, without the consent and joinder of that
other, and the rights of judgment creditors can rise no higher than
those of their debtors. The right to mortgage the estate- with the
consent of the husband is as much a part of the enjoyment of the
estate by the wife as is the right of the husband to sell the estate
with the consent of the wife. To give a judgment creditor of one
tenant a greater right than the holder of a mortgage from both is
an interference with this enjoyment irre pective of the time of the
execution of the mortgage.
In theory, a mortgage is a conveyance of the title to the
estate, and if the conveyance by deed passes the title clear of the
lien of a judgment, the conveyance by mortgage should have the
same effect. It is for this reason that we take issue with the
court in the case of Feek vs. Zilhaver, and with the Supreme Court in
the case of Bcihl vs. Marlin, when it bases its distinction between
the two cases upon the face that in the one case the form of aliena-
tion was a mortgage, and in the other a deed.
The correctness of this position taken by our. courts is ques-
tioned upon the additional ground spoken of before. They hold
the right to sell to be one of the privileges possessed by the co-
owners and not the right to mortgage. We have said that, theo-
retically, a mortgage is a conveyance of the title; in practice in
our state it is not. Let us, therefore, deal practically with the
question: What Title Company will insure the mortgage on such
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an estate with a prior judgment on record against one of the co-
tenants in view of the decisions in Fleek vs. Zilhaver and Beihi vs.
Martin? And how many investors will accept a mortgage which
a title insurance company will not insure? Certainly, not very
many.
One reason advanced for the position taken by the court in
these cases is that the surviving "tenant acquires no new estate
upon the death of his co-tenant, and that the judgment is a lien
on the same estate. While this is true insofar as quantity is con.
cerned, it is not true in respect to tie quality. He is now sole
owner in fee of the estati, whereas formerly, to put it freely, he
was only co-tenant in fee. As co-tenant, the interest of the other
tenant had to be considered, as survivor he need consult the wishes
of no one. This being so, it is submitted that the survivor does
acquire something new, he acquires something which at once
inures to the benefit of his judgment creditors, but it comes to
the survivor burdened with such liabilities as were imposed on it
by the joint action of the cb-tenants in the life time of both.
Let us take the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in our principal
case" foi a moment: "The rights of the parties are fixed by the
deed of conveyance to them, and by that instrument each took
an entirety made up of indivisible parts. Any- alienation by one,
the other not consenting, of any interest whatever in the estate,
if allowed, would be an abridgement pro tanto of the rights of the
other. By their joint act they admittedly have the right to sell
and dispose of the whole estate; by their joint act they may strip
the estate of its attributes and create a wholly different estate in
themselves; but neither can divest himself or herself of any part
without in some way infringing upon the rights of the other. The
wife has the right to initiate as well as the husband. Suppose
she desires to sell the land-a right which is hers-and the hus-
band consents, what does his consent amount to if he has parted
with his expectancy of ownership to a stranger? Such circumstances
would operate to deny to the wife the enjoyment of an inseparable in-
cident of ownership, the right of alienation."
We assent most emphatically to this part of the opinion and
respectfully submit that in the light of this argument the court
" Stuckey vs. Keefe, supra
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has changed its position taken in the case of Fleek vs. Zilhaver.
As we have already said, the cases, though involving different
facts, give rise to the same principle; that being so, we ask again:
Is not the right to mortgage as much one of the rights of initia-
tion which the wife has, as is the right to alienate? Both privileges
involve the right to enjoy and differ only in the degree of the
enjoyment. We submit further that so long as the case of F/kek
vs. Zilmver represents the law of our state, this right of the wife
to mortgage the estate cannot be exercised if a judgment has been
entered against her husband, as has been pointed out heretofore.
So far as the right of the wife to "initiate" is concerned, it amounts
to one and the same thing.whether the husband sells his right of
expectancy or permits a judgment to be entered against him.
Since the court admits that the wife has the right to initiate, we
may now ask this second question: Suppose she desire to mortgage
the land-a right which is hers-and the husband consent, what
does his consent amount to if he has parted with so much of his
expectaicy as will be necessary to pay a judgment entered against
him? -Such dicumstance would operate to deny to the wife the
enjoyment of an inseparable incident of ownership, the right to
motgage. Surely the only difference here between the judgment
and the sale of the expectancy is one oi degree alone.
In an earlier part of the opinion,' Mr. Justice Stewart says:
"We start in the discussion with an admission which the case
of Fleck vs. Zilhaver, supra, compels, that the judgments here ob-
tained against the husband were liens, but upon what? Cer-
tainly not upon the entirety that was in the husband, for the
entirety of estate was in the wife equally with the husbandand
being in its nature indivisible, it would follow necessarily that any
encumbrance upon the estate of the one would rest upon that of
the other, a result which, of course, could not be justified or al-
lowed except as the inherent attributes of the estate are to be
wholly disregarded."
Surely, if the act of one tenant alone is not a lien upon the entirely,
but merely upon the expectancy of survivorship, this lien must be
postponed to a valid lien created jointly by both tenants upon ths
estate ie4f. The court in Fleck vs. Zilhaver, as has been pointed
14BelI v. Martin, upr, at page 27.
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out, held otherwise, and the opinion filed by Mr. Justice Stewart
in the case of Beihi vs. Martin, upholds this decision. If the court
in that case was right in the view taken as shown by our quota-
tions from the opinion (supra) and we submit that it is, the de-
cision in Fleck vs. Zilhaver is not, and rather than attempt to dis-
tinguish it, the court's error should have been acknowledged. The
failure to do this, as we have already said, increased the existing
confusion. -It will be recalled that we quoted from the opinion
of the court this statement:
"It is to be observed that it (Fleck vs. Zilhaver) does not rule
that there can be a severance of the ownership in any other way
than by the death of one or other of the parties, or by voluntary
alienation by both."
We ask, therefore, what result will be reached if, upon the
same state of facts as those in the case of Fleck vs. Zihaver, the
mortgagee issues a scire facias sur mortgage in the life time of both
tenants? In view of this opinion and the distinction it makes
bewteen the two cases, will the court hold that the purchaser at
such sale takes clear of the encumbrance of the judgment? On
principle this would be true, but if the court follows its decision
logically, it would be compelled to hold otherwise, for according
to the position taken a mortgage is not a conveyance, and the
opinion in Beihl vs. Martin confines a severance to a voluntary
conveyance or death of one tenant.
Have the married women's acts had any effect on this ven-
erable estate? In the case of Stuckey vs. Keefe, supra, which
arose before these acts, a conveyance made to husband and wife
tas tenants in common," and not as joint tenants, was held to
constitute the grantees tenants by entireties, upon the ground
that the estate by entireties was created by a rule of law irre-
spective of the intention of the parties; and from the preceding
cases it must be admitted that the presumption of unity, between
husband and wife, which arises from their marriage precludes the
consideration of the intention of the parties. It would seem,
therefore, that in order to change the rule the legal presumption
must be changed. The real question, therefore, is, has this pre-
sumption been changed by the married women's acts?
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In cases following Stuckey vs. Keefe, it has been held that
estates by entireties have not been abolished by the Act of z848,
or the Separate Property Act of 1887, and that such estate would
be created by the same conveyance as at common law notwith-
standing these acts.1 In Bambery's Estate, supra, the court said:
"It has been contended, and in some jurisdictions held, that the
legislation which secured to the wife the enjoyment of her separate
estate is destructive of the legal unity of husband and wife upon
which tenancy by entiretes depends. But the better v;ew is that
such tenancies are not desttoyd or impaired by it."
In the case of Diver -vs. Diver, supra, Strong, J., in delivering
the opiniorn of the court said: "To hold it (Act of April ii, x848)
as operating upon a deed of land to a wife making such deed assure
a different estate from what it would have assured without the
Act is to lose sight of the legislative purpose. . . . . Were
we to do so it would become, in many cases, a means of divesting
her of her property instead of an instrument of protection.
We hold then that no such effect is to be given .to the Act
of 1848, or any of its cognate Acts ........ .The legal unity
of husband and wife still exists.......
In an earlier case, the court went further and said that not-
withstanding the passage of the Married Women's Act of x848,
a conveyance to a husband and wife "To have and to hold the
said lot or piece of ground as tenants in common and not as joint
tenants" created an estate by entireties.6 Yet, in a case dlecided
in xgox, Mr. Justice Mitchell said: "But in no case that has been
brought to our attention was there anything to show an express.
intent of the parties to take otherwise than according tc the legal
presumption. The incapacity of husband and wife to take as
joint tenants or tenants in common was a strict logical deduction
from their entire unity at common law. When the statutes in
relation to Married Women severed this unity as to property, the
reason of the rule no longer existed. There never was any incap-
acity to hold as tenants in common if the conveyance we made
to them before marriage. 2 Cruise 494; 2 Plowden 483, cited in
Stuckey vs. Keefe, supra. And it may -be considered as still
15 Diver vs. Diver, 56 Pa. 1o6; Bambery's Estate. 156 Pa. 6a&
14 McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa- 39 (1870).
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an open question whether they may not, now, since the acts re-
ferred to, take as well as hold in common, if that be the actual
intent, notwithstanding, the legal presumption to the contrary."'"
In the case of Beihl vs. Martin, supra, Mr. Chief Justice
Stewart in the opening paragraph of his opinion said: "It may be
that because of modem innovations on the common law respecting
the property rights of married women, the venerable estate kiown
as estates by entireties has outlived the purpose of its creation and
is out of harmony with present conditions. However this may
be, if change is desired, it must come through legislative acts and
not through judicial construction. This estate is too well estab-
lished and too well defined to be subject to judicial impairment."
These cases compel the conclusion that the determination
of our question depends upon the legislative intention as expressed
in the married women's acts and the result of that intention.
One conclusion must be admitted; if the purpose of the acts was
as Strong, J., said in Diver vs. Diver, supra, to protect the property
of the married woman-then the intention of the parties as ex-
pressed in the conveyance must govern; so that if at the present
time a conveyance is made to the husband and wife as tenants in
common and not as joint tenants, they should take as tenants in
common, for surely the wife who is only granted the interest of
one of two tenants in common can not ask to be granted, or pro-
tected in a different right.
It is submitted, however, that the married women's act
went further than to protect the property rights of married women-
it extends those rights. The rights of a married woman to deal
with or hold property granted to her were few indeed at common
law. The Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, Section i provides that
hereafter: "A married woman shall have the same right and
power as an unmarried person to acquire, own, possess, control,
use, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of any property of any kind-
real, personal or mixed . . . . ana may exercise the said
right, and power in the same manner and to the same extent as
an unmarried person ........ " Surely this- must be con-
sidered an enabling act. The rights enumerated in these acts
7 Merritt vs. Whitlock, 200 Pa., at page 55.
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are additional rights granted and not merely existing rights pro-
tected. The question is not, therefore, whether "because of
modern innovations the venerable estate known as estates by
entireties has outlived its purpose," but it is whether the reason
for the creation of that estate exists or not. Can it be said in the
light of this legislation that husband and wife in the eyes of the
law today are "one"? The argument advanced by. Chief Justice
Mitchell, that if change is desired it must come through legislative
acts and not through judicial construction, while it rightfully
recognired the line between -legislative and judicial functions,
nevertheless begA the question. If at common law it were held
to be a crime for a married woman to hold property and an act
were passed providing that thereafter a married woman might
acquire, hold, own, and possess property in the same manner as
a woman unmarried, the question would be whether the act had
abolished the crime, and it is submitted that that was the question
before the court in the case of Beihl vs. Martin, supra.
. Many jurisdictions have taken the view that after the enact-
ment. of the married women's acts, the unity of husband and
wife was destroyed. In Illinois, it was said that by the Act of
z861 conferring upon married women the right to acquire property
and hold and enjoy the same free from the husband's control, the
rule that a conveyance to husband and wife made them tenants
by entirety ceases to exist," and the same effect has been at-
tributed to these acts upon this estate in Alabama, and other of
our states have followed the same line of reasoning.P
In England, Parliament passed what is known as the Married
Woman's Property. Act, 45 and 46 Vict., Clause 75. Since then
it has been held that the old rule of law that husband and wife
were for most purposes one person and so that under a gift by
will to a husband and wife and a third person, a husband and wife
took only one moiety between them and the third person took
the other moiety is not iiow applicable to such a gift under a will
that came into operation since the commencement of that act.20
n MitcheU vs. Care, z33 I. 68.
" Wothal v. Gorce, 36 At. 728 (z896).
" ri ro March--Mauder vs. Hars. 24 Ch. D. 2.
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It is submitted that from these authorities there is much to
be said in favor of the view that since the passage of the married
women's act, the unity of husband and wife no longer exists, and
that, if tenancies by the entirety are not abolished, at least the
creation of such an estate has become dependent upon the inten-
tion of the parties.
Harry .JSapiro.
Philadelphia, April 4, 1913.
